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Dictators at War and Peace (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

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International relations scholars have long been interested in the implications of democracy for foreign policy, whether in classical realist arguments that democracies are ill-suited to the effective conduct of power politics or in more recent arguments that democracies are both good at managing their relations with one another and particularly effective at war. Some of these arguments turn out to apply to all types of political regimes, whereas others are unique to autocracies.

We hope that ISSF readers find these essays, as well as Weeks’s reply, to be stimulating and informative, and as encouragement to read Dictators at War and Peace itself. He argues that I do not engage enough with an alternative diversionary explanation for the war, namely that that General Galtieri had reason to fear severe punishment (such as death, imprisonment, or exile) if he lost office, which he expected would come at the hands of naval minister Jorge Anaya if he did not make progress on the Falklands.Since the four factors mentioned earlier neatly organize themselves into four regime types, it is not really possible to evaluate which factors drive decisions for conflict. The picture sketched by Brooks could not be more different: out-of-control military officials essentially committed the state to war without the knowledge or consent of the Egyptian Strongman, whom they had deceived about the preparedness of the Egyptian army. I think, however, that to characterize my argument as side-stepping the bargaining model of war is not accurate.

e., violent) means, slightly more than half were removed by military actors, [19] and (2) military Juntas are the least common type of regime in Weeks’s typology, [20] which implies that these coups are probably not limited to military-led regimes. Roughly 38%, however, lost office in an irregular manner [33], and 76% of those faced severe punishment in the form of exile (52%), imprisonment (15%) and/or death (2%).

In this cogent analysis of the important variation among autocratic regimes when it comes to decisions about war and peace, Jessica L. While the book does not delve into Wilhemine Germany, Downes’s description suggests that the leadership of this period might, like Japan, be coded as a junta because of the domestic power of the military. In addition to Dictators at War and Peace (Cornell University Press, 2014), she has published in journals including the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, and International Organization. D., University of Chicago, 2004) is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University. is nothing less than to explain the initiation of conflict, the probability of defeat, the probability of (post-conflict) punishment of the leader and/or regime members after a defeat, and the decision-making process in different authoritarian regimes (35).

My argument suggests that the bargaining range is smaller when one leader is relatively immune to the costs of fighting or losing wars, gains private benefits from war, or has inaccurate assessments of the likelihood of winning, each of which is influenced by domestic regime type.

It is a bit puzzling, thus, to see the directed-dyad-year as the unit of analysis in Chapter 2, the quantitative chapter. I raise the issue because the case study chapters also do not ex ante identify threats to see whether domestic audiences punish leaders for failing to carry through on their threats.

The country’s intelligence agencies (controlled by Amer) were so consumed with spying on Nasser and his allies that information about the Israeli military was in short supply. Moreover, retaking the islands posed a major military challenge, requiring the British to carry out amphibious landings thousands of miles from home with no local base from which to operate. Between Bosses and Strongmen, the latter are slightly more conflict-prone and more likely to lose wars, again because the military experience of the leader makes force a more attractive option. If the peacetime threat of domestic punishment is high, the use of force with the potential for political domestic rewards in the case of victory can be a rational gamble, even if defeat carries a high concomitant likelihood of punishment. One other minor flaw is the author's obvious personal unfamiliarity with the professional military and with the men and women who make national security decisions.Weeks differentiates authoritarian regimes that do not have an audience that can potentially punish the leader (personalist dictatorships) from authoritarian regimes that do have such audiences, but ignores the strategic interactions between domestic actors. Weeks (78) codes Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1967 as a Strongman—a leader with a military background constrained by no audience—but Brooks depicts Nasser as locked in a fierce competition for power with his military chief, Abdel Hakim Amer.

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